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Since the illegal Russian seizure of Crimea and the outbreak of violence in the Donbas 
region much has been made of whether or not the United States and European countries 
should, or could, assist the Ukrainian government. The purpose of this project is to present 
recommendations for policy makers, diplomats, defense leaders, and legislators on how the 
United States can help strengthen Ukraine.  While there are those that believe the United 
States should not be involved in Ukraine, we believe strengthening the Ukrainian government is 
vital to countering Russian aggression and restoring stability to the region. Russia has 
challenged the established post-World War II international order with its aggressive actions 
towards Ukraine, both through its illegal annexation of Crimea and its support for separatist 
factions in the Donbas region.    
This project comprises four sections exploring how to strengthen Ukrainian institutions, 
the Ukrainian military, the Ukrainian economy, and how to assist the Ukrainians in countering 
Russian propaganda.  Within each section we will present background on the topic and make 
recommendations for how the United States government can work with Ukraine.   
In an effort to counter Russian aggression and ill-will towards Ukraine and its people, we posit 
the following recommendations: 
 Strengthen Ukrainian institutions by focusing on assisting Ukraine in reforming their 
judicial system, government, and banks in order to lower the perception of corruption in 
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Ukrainian society. For details on these recommendations please see “Strengthening 
Ukrainian Institutions” starting on page 4. 
 Strengthen Ukraine’s military by increasing Ukraine’s ability to conventionally deter a 
potential Russian aggression. That can be accomplished by bolstering Ukraine’s 
conventional forces. This will give them the capability to increase the cost of aggression 
to outweigh the benefit. We recommend a strategy of 1) defense loans and 2) military 
partnership and engagement focused on training and modernizing Ukrainian forces.  For 
details on these recommendations please see “Strengthening the Ukrainian Military” 
starting on page 16. 
 Strengthen Ukraine’s economy by increasing the long-term self-sufficiency and 
independence of the Ukrainian Economy. That can be achieved through: 1) forging 
economic partnerships, 2) exchanging knowledge and technical skills, and 3) continuing 
commitment to international norms.   For details on these recommendations please see 
“Strengthening the Ukrainian Economy” starting on page 31. 
 Assist Ukraine in its efforts to counter Russian propaganda. Recommendations are 
provided to: 1) hinder the disinformation campaign from Russia that targets Ukrainians 
inside the Donbas region, as well as those outside of the region, 2) providing funding to 
media outlets, and 3) supporting judiciary promises of press freedom. For details on 
these recommendations please see “Countering Russian Propaganda” starting on page 
47. 
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Strengthening Ukrainian Institutions 
This section will discuss strengthening Ukrainian Institutions. It will focus on assisting 
Ukraine in reforming its governance system, judicial system and banking system with the aim of 
lowering the perception of corruption in Ukraine. Ukraine lacks the necessary stability and 
strength it needs in order to combat Russian aggression. In order to build a stronger Ukraine, 
there needs to be a concerted effort by Ukraine and its allies on strengthening state 
institutions. Weak institutions hinder economic growth, meaning that overall social progress 
can’t be obtained without building up internal infrastructure. A stumbling block to bolstering 
the institutions of Ukraine has been the pervasiveness of corruption. This has exacerbated the 
already taxed and overwhelmed sectors of the government.  The policy recommendations 
outlined in the preceding section not only allow the perception of corruption to decrease in 
Ukraine, but also serve as a cornerstone that Ukraine can use to build legitimacy in order to 
make strides in other areas of its government. By doing so it will build Ukrainian society’s trust 
in its government, result in sustained economic growth, and allow the state to carry out various 
policies that deliver benefits and services to not only the population but outside investors.   
Governance 
The overall goal of governance reforms is to create a more transparent and accountable 
government by: 
 Ensuring the newly created corruption oversight body National Anti-Bureau of Ukraine 
(NABU) is allowed effective oversight powers by the Ukrainian government.1 
                                                          
1 National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. Accessed September 06, 2016. https://nabu.gov.ua/en. 
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 Limiting private funding of political parties. 
The first pillar of strengthening Ukrainian institutions is to make meaningful reforms to 
its governance system. Currently, Ukraine is ranked 88 out of 167 on the democracy index 
scale.2 This shows that Ukrainian institutions as a whole are structured as a democracy. 
However, Ukraine’s ranking on the corruption perception index scale is 130 out of 167.3 This 
indicates that the governmental institutions are not functioning to their full capacity, nor are 
Ukrainian leaders carrying out the tenants of a democratic nation. The democratic 
infrastructure is there, but it is not being implemented effectively enough as evidence in the 
low perception index. In fact, nearly 64 percent of Ukrainians see their government as being 
corrupt, a hindrance to Ukraine being able to provide the governmental functions that it should 
to its citizens.4  
The proposed policy solution to combat corruption in Ukraine was the creation of a 
corruption oversight body with tangible enforcement powers to combat, prosecute, and uphold 
corruption laws. This perceived corruption is seen because Ukrainian citizens do not see its 
elites, who tend to be in governmental positions, as being held accountable for publicized 
corruption, which makes Ukrainian citizens lose faith in the very institutions that are supposed 
to provide for its citizens. By strengthening NABU and its powers, the Ukrainian government 
will be showing its citizens that they are fully committed to ensuring that the democratic values 
                                                          
2 "Democracy Index 2015." The Economist - Economic Intelligence Unit, 2016, 6. Accessed September 17, 2016. 
http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=EIU-Democracy-Index-
2015.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015. 
3 Transparency International. "Corruption Perception Index 2015." Transparency International - The Global Anti-
Corruption Coalition. Accessed October 1, 2016. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/. 
4 "Study: Corruption Seen as a Great Challenge in Europe, Asia." Fox News. 2016. Accessed October 15, 2016. 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/11/15/study-corruption-seen-as-great-challenge-in-europe-asia.html. 
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of Ukraine are exhibited, while corruption is being combatted. The reforms enacted after the 
Maidan Revolution are evidence that Ukraine is willing to make strides in order to combat 
corruption in the country. NABU will ensure that those reforms are being met, as well as act as 
a vehicle for enacting further reforms to combat corruption in Ukraine.5 Corruption in Ukraine 
is a hindrance to prosperity in the country, and NABU will ensure that corruption decreases 
allowing Ukraine to make governmental reforms in other areas as well. By enacting corruption 
reforms the relationship between the state and its people can be strengthened. 
Restructuring political parties is another manner in which the government can 
strengthen its relationship with the Ukrainian people. In the case of political parties, the 
absence of any restrictions on the value of private donations creates a strong dependence on 
wealthy donors, which severely limits the extent to which parties are able to represent societal 
interests.6 As a result, the public sector suffers from limited governed independence and lacks 
adequate resources to be able to play any meaningful role in fighting against corruption. The 
proposed policy solution is to establish reforms on donation regulations to political parties, as 
well as expanding NABU to oversee political donations to political parties. Additionally, limit the 
amount that individual donors can donate to a political party or politician. This will ensure that 
private donations, while still allowed, are curtailed to defray the amount of influence any one 
particular wealthy donor can exercise. Additionally, limiting the ties between the economic and 
                                                          
5 United States Department of State, "Ukrainian Reforms Two Years After the Maidan Revolution and the Russian 
Invasion."March 15, 2016. Accessed October 28, 2016. 
https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2016/mar/254707.htm. 
6 International Foundation for Electoral Systems, and USAID. "Regulations of Parliamentary Campaign Finance in 
Ukraine." Regulations of Parliamentary Campaign Finance in Ukraine, August 2012, 3. Accessed October 29, 2016. 
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/ukraine_report_on_campaign_finance_regulation_august_2012_final.pdf. 
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the political elites will allow each of these entities to establish more legitimacy within the layers 
of Ukrainian government.  
Finally, in order to have meaningful governance reform, Ukraine must acknowledge its 
procedural actions versus its substantive actions. While reforms are critical and necessary in 
order for Ukraine to strengthen its government, the reforms must be implemented fully. The 
citizens of Ukraine know that reforms have been enacted, however, they are not currently 
being enforced. Additionally, Ukraine must make sure that it is following through with 
punishing those who do not comply with the reforms.  
Together with corruption oversight, restructuring political parties and focusing on 
substantive actions versus procedural, Ukraine can enact governance reforms that will not only 
increase its democracy index. This will ensure that the necessary and proper steps are taken to 
gain the trust of its people allowing for Ukraine to progress forward. 
Judicial  
The overall goal of the judiciary policy recommendations are to counter corruption by 
promoting judicial transparency, accountability, and efficiency by: 
 Reforming the laws dictating the appointment and dismissal of judges. 
 Consolidating the extensive number of court levels to allow for quicker rulings and a 
reduction in the number of judges in the system. 
 Facilitating international judiciary exchanges with European judiciary institutions to 
bring the Ukrainian judicial system in line with European standards when it comes to the 
rule of law.   
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The Constitution of Ukraine outlines the branches of government and its aim is to create a 
separation of powers meaning the judiciary should be devoid of influence. That said, there is a 
lack of judicial independence in Ukraine and the system has long been plagued with accusations 
of rampant corruption. Traditionally, judges have been appointed by the executive branch, 
which leads to political pressure being a factor in rulings.7 This in turn diminishes the ability of 
the judiciary to hold the executive accountable through effective measures. The Ukrainian 
Constitution has been amended over the past year to limit the ability of the President to 
dismiss judges. In June 2016 the Ukrainian Parliament approved judicial reforms amending the 
constitution which aims to curb the political influence on the appointment of judges and limit 
their immunity in cases of malpractice.8 The reform is aimed at making judges more 
professional. It partly limits their immunity from prosecution, which used to be unconditional. 
From now on they will be appointed by a judicial council (The High Council of Judges) rather 
than parliament which will hopefully shield them from political influence. We recommend that 
the Ukrainian Parliament and the President elect judges in much the same way it is done in the 
United States, with the executive branch nominating judges and the legislative branch 
approving them. By instituting this reform judges will not be purged when a new government is 
elected ensuring continuity of the judiciary branch. In turn, cases will be heard in a timely 
manner because the courts hearing them will not be constantly changing. While positive steps 
forward have been, made it needs to be specified in the constitution that the High Council of 
                                                          
7United States Agency for International Development, Corruption Assessment: Ukraine 2015. Pg7.  
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK247.pdf  
8Alexei Kalmykov and Alessandra Prentice, “Ukraine’s corrupt judges targeted in constitutional reforms,” Rueters, 
June 2, 2016. Accessed November 1, 2016: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-parliament-reform-
idUSKCN0YO1NY 
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Judges, the entity now charged with dismissing judges, has the power to decide on judges’ 
transfers and promotions as well. The President is currently able to influence this process of the 
judiciary and the constitution needs to be amended to prevent such interference.9 These 
reforms provide for a level of impartiality and protection of judicial independence that has not 
been guaranteed in the past.  
There needs to be a consolidation of the divisions of the judiciary. Currently, there is an 
extensive framework that dictates what legal cases are heard in what court and all the 
subsequent levels plaintiffs and defendants need to go through over the course of their case.10 
Reforming the court system by cutting the numerous levels of existing bureaucracy in the 
judicial system allows for expediency in judges hearing court cases and quicker resolutions. If 
verdicts are to be respected they need to be executed in a timely manner in conjunction with 
the rule of law. The current system hinders speedy trials, meaning cases take considerable time 
to be ruled on, if they are ever heard. Reducing the number of judicial courts through 
consolidation would also lead to a reduction in the number of judges. This would be beneficial 
to combatting corruption since there would be less unscrupulous individuals in the system. The 
fewer the number of judges in the system, the less opportunity for corruption and any new 
judges who would be appointed would be through the newly reformed system outlined 
previously.  
                                                          
9 Council of Europe, “Venice Commission: Annual report of activities of 2015,” August 2016. 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-RA(2015)001-e 
10 Svitlana Oliynyk, “The Criminal Justice System of Ukraine,” United Nations Asia and Far East, September 2013.  
Institutehttp://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages/RMS/No92_11PA_Oliynyk.pdf 
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Greater transparency will ensure accountability of judicial institutions and reduce 
opportunities for corruption amongst judges. Wages in the judiciary system are abysmal and as 
such it makes officials susceptible to bribery.11 Judges need to be properly compensated in 
order to combat bribery. Furthermore, the courts need to be financed and equipped 
appropriately in order to effectively function. There needs to be an implementation of 
legislation that compels judges and prosecutors to provide financial disclosures. This will give 
oversight bodies a better idea of the financial status of its judges and more easily see if they 
have been accepting bribes. It will also ensure sufficient and transparent funding of the 
judiciary and exclude the possibility private individuals or government officials from financing 
the legal system.  
Creating public trust in the judiciary system is essential. Ukraine currently ranks at 130 out 
of 167 on the 2015 Corruption Perception Index Scale (CPI) conducted by Transparency 
International. Additionally, 87 percent of citizens perceive the judiciary to be corrupt or 
extremely corrupt and only 46 percent of Ukrainians believe that the courts consider their cases 
in an independent and impartial manner.12  It should be noted that the CPI seeks to measure 
perception as opposed to the reality of corruption due to the obvious barriers to conducting 
such a study. While the ranking is based on perception, it remains a strong indicator of reality. 
Policing reforms have been relatively successful throughout Ukraine13, however once someone 
                                                          
11 Anders Aslund, “How Ukraine became a Market Economy and Democracy,”(Washington DC: Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 2009) pg245. 
https://books.google.com/books?id=C8C3xuqd6aMC&pg=PA245#v=onepage&q&f=false 
12 Corruption Perception Index 2015, Transparency International. Accessed November 1, 2016: 
https://www.transparency.org/country/#UKR   
13 USAID, “Corruption in Ukraine 2015.”  
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enters the legal system the perception is corruption takes over. Despite the strides made in 
modernization of the police force there is still work to be done in order for justice to prevail. 
This makes no difference though when the perception is that the institution is corrupt it loses 
all credibility in civil society. No matter how many legislative reforms are passed, if society does 
not see any real progress being made they will not believe the reforms are being effective. Up 
to 59 percent of Ukrainian citizens feel their government’s efforts to fight corruption are 
ineffective.14 This stems from the corruption in the judiciary. Until the Ukrainian elites are held 
accountable in a way that is visible to the public, the impression that the judiciary is still corrupt 
will not change. To that end, high level officials and businessmen who have been accused of 
crimes but not held accountable in the past, need to face trial in the newly reformed judiciary 
system. 
To improve better judiciary practices we propose judicial exchanges between legal officials in 
Ukraine and Europe. The Ukrainian judicial system is structured in much the same way as 
European courts. This would bring Ukraine more in line with European standards and create 
closer ties with Europe. This can be achieved with increased funding of USAID programs 
earmarked for judicial development and the State Department’s International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs initiatives to reform the Ukrainian justice sector. USAID and its 
partners currently have a number of programs aimed at judiciary reforms in Ukraine.15 These 
                                                          
14 Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International.   
15 United States Agency for International Development, “Democracy, Human Rights and Governance,” Accessed 
November 2, 2016: https://www.usaid.gov/ukraine/democracy-human-rights-and-governance 
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programs need to be continually funded as they are a key means though which the United 
States Government can assist Ukraine in its judiciary reforms.  
 Economic 
The overall goal of these economic reforms are (1) to ensure a more equal distribution of 
wealth and (2) to promote fair competition, to make investors feel confident: 
 Increasing GNI by allowing by allowing for the creation of a stronger middle class.  
 Consolidating the banking system. 
While governance and judicial reforms are essential to Ukrainian success, economic 
reforms are equally just as important. When wealth is not distributed amongst the population it 
prevents the creation of a strong middle class.16 The lack of a vibrant middle class is due to 
power and money being concentrated amongst an elite few in the country. This perpetuates 
the perceptions of corruption, weakens civic engagement and ultimately damages Ukraine. 
These weaknesses make Ukraine even more susceptible to internal and external actors seeking 
to manipulate and take advantage of the country’s instability. Further, when all Ukrainians are 
doing well financially, the entire society is invested in the continuation of the political and 
economic system. 
As of now, that is not happening in Ukraine due to the control of the economy by a few 
powerful individuals who benefit from keeping the status quo. Newsweek estimates that 
                                                          
16 David Madland, "Growth and the Middle Class." Democracy Journal, Spring 2011. Accessed November 3, 2016. 
http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/20/growth-and-the-middle-class/. 
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oligarchs control nearly 70 percent of Ukraine’s economy.17 This means that the distribution of 
wealth in Ukraine is extremely unequal, thereby delegitimizing the government of Ukraine.  
This poor economic management has also given rise to electoral volatility in Ukraine 
resulting in the country being denied further economic opportunities as other nations are 
reluctant from establishing bilateral economic opportunities with Ukraine. It should also be 
noted that the GNI per capita for Ukraine is near the bottom along with when compared with 
countries similar to Ukraine. However, its GDP is in the middle, showing the effect that the 
oligarchic system has had on Ukraine. These results show that money is in fact being generated 
at the national level, but it is not filtering its way down to the local level, or perhaps not being 
reinvested into society. See figure(s) 1 and 2 below. 
Figure 1: GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)18 
 
                                                          
17 Lutsevych, Orysia. "Ukraine Has an Oligarch Problem, Too." Newsweek. April 12, 2015. Accessed November 5, 
2016. http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-has-oligarch-problem-too-321551. 
18 "The World Bank - GNI Per Capita, PPP (current International $)." The World Bank - GNI Per Capita. Accessed 
November 15, 2016. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD?locations=EE-KZ-RU-RO-BY-GE-UA-
MD. 
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Figure 2: GDP per capita19 
 
Data has shown that a strong middle class is conducive to economic growth. Further, 
the economic system will not get better unless banking institutions are reformed. In order to 
reform the banking system of Ukraine, the country should reform its State Export-Import Bank 
of Ukraine (Ex-Im) bank. Currently, it is 100 percent state-owned and it is one of the largest 
banks in Ukraine.20 By reforming the Ex-Im bank, Ukraine can potentially allow more free 
market activities in dealing with its exports and imports. Additionally, the banking system could 
be able to take on more services that western banks have to offer than the limited services 
currently offered in Ukraine. Additional reforms can ensure that loans, that banks such as the 
Ex-Im bank give out, are used for their intended purpose and not abused. Countering banking 
corruption will ensure that the GNI per capita will increase, as well the GDP per capita of 
Ukraine.  
                                                          
19 "The World Bank - GDP Per Capita." The World Bank - GDP Per Capita. Accessed November 15, 2016. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=EE-KZ-RU-RO-BY-GE-UA-MD. 
20 Ukrainian Independent Information Agency of News "State-run Ukreximbank Posts UAH 14 Bln in Loss in 2015.". 
Accessed November 9, 2016. http://www.unian.info/economics/1335029-state-run-ukreximbank-posts-uah-14-
bln-in-loss-in-2015.html. 
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Reforming Ukraine’s banking system also calls for consolidation of banks. By 
consolidating banks, this will negate the rampant corruption currently in Ukraine, which aligns 
with the governance reforms mentioned above. Additionally, consolidating banks in Ukraine 
will foster potential investment and small business loans, which gives hope to the Ukrainian 
people that their government is working for them and allowing them to succeed.  
Ukraine must also have full transparency in its banking system. Full transparency will 
ensure that a governmental body can act as a check and balance for the banking system and 
make sure that the banks are acting with Ukrainian law. Countering banking corruption will be 
difficult. The oligarchs who currently control most of Ukraine’s wealth have the most to lose if 
the status quo changes and banking reforms are allowed. They benefit from Ukraine remaining 
in turmoil.  
All of these recommendations are aimed at making Ukrainian institutions stronger. Only 
by building up Ukrainian governance, the judiciary, and economic policies can Ukraine prosper. 
These policies are essential to combatting corruption and ensuring a stable Ukraine.  
Addressing institutional weaknesses is key to ensuring the policy recommendations in the 
subsequent sections of this paper are successful.  
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Strengthening the Ukrainian Military 
 
Russian Military Capabilities  
 The phrase “know your enemy” is an old adage of military strategy, so before we can 
discuss ways to strengthen the Ukrainian military we must get to know the Russian military, as 
they are the adversary the Ukrainians are most likely to face. The Russian military is an 
impressive force that is in the midst of its most ambitious modernization effort since the end of 
the Cold War. The Russian government has gone to great lengths to show off their new military 
might domestically through military parades and demonstrations, and internationally through 
the actions in Syria and in the skies over Europe. Some observers are not convinced that the 
Russian military has improved as much as the Kremlin would like the world to believe. They 
argue that the Russian military is a paper tiger that has showcased many impressive new 
weapons systems and technologies, but is still mostly comprised of poorly trained conscript 
soldiers that cannot fight effectively.21 The economic situation in Russia is also cited as a reason 
to doubt the ability of the Russian military to perform as advertised. In reality the Russian 
military’s capabilities most likely fall somewhere in the middle of these observations. To 
attempt to give an accurate description of the Russian capabilities we will first explore the 
composition and disposition of Russian forces, especially those located nearest to Ukraine.  
Then we will discuss the modernization efforts, personnel issues, and economic issues in an 
attempt to define Russia’s true military capabilities.  
                                                          
21 Andrew S. Bowen, “Russia's Deceptively Weak Military,” The National Interest, June 7, 2015, 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-deceptively-weak-military-13059?page=2.  
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  Russia maintains one of the largest militaries in the world in terms of personnel and 
heavy equipment.  According to The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
publication The Military Balance 2016 the Russian military has 798,000 personnel on active 
duty, making them the fourth largest standing army in the world behind China, the United 
States, and India.22  Russia has the world’s largest reserve force with over 2 million personnel in 
their reserve ranks, which is almost 850,000 men larger than the next largest reserve force in 
the world (India at 1,155,000). The Russian state also maintains 489,000 personnel in its 
paramilitary ranks, which include the Federal Border Guard Service, Federal Protection Service, 
commando units within the Federal Security Service (FSB), and Interior Ministry Troops.  While 
these numbers are much smaller than the 4 million plus personnel on active duty in the Soviet 
Armed Forces at the end of the Cold War, they nonetheless show that Russia can field a 
massive military force when looking at sheer personnel numbers. 
 While there are 
questions about the 
quality of their weaponry, 
the Russians possess 
huge stockpiles of 
military equipment. The 
Russian military ranks in 
the top three globally in 
                                                          
22 The Military Balance 2016, ed. James Hackett (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 
22. Unless otherwise noted, all military figures used in this paper come from The Military Balance 2016.  
THE T-14 MAIN BATTLE TANK, PART OF THE ARMATA FAMILY OF VEHICLES, HAVE BEEN 
A SYMBOL OF RUSSIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION.  
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most categories when comparing key pieces of defense equipment. Russian ground forces rely 
heavily on armed vehicles with over 7,500 armored fighting vehicles and almost 3,000 main 
battle tanks currently in service. Comparatively, this is about equal to the number of main 
battle tanks in the United States inventory and about 3,000 more armored fighting vehicles. 
The Russian ground forces place a large emphasis on the use of indirect fire assets and have 
almost 10,000 pieces of artillery in their arsenal.  Many of the Russian modernization efforts 
have focused on these types of heavy ground vehicles. Russian combat aircraft, most of which 
fall under the Russian Aerospace Force, have undergone some modernization but are still 
mainly Soviet equipment from the 1980s. There are plans to include fighter and bomber aircraft 
in the modernization efforts, but the economic constraints facing Russia are hindering those 
plans.  Russia has put a large emphasis on anti-aircraft and surface-to-surface weapons as part 
of the modernization efforts, and can pose a formidable challenge to any force attempting to 
penetrate Russian held territory.  Russian military planners were highly influenced by the 
massive air campaigns undertaken by the United States and partnered countries against Serbia, 
Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya.  The Russian military still has anti-aircraft capabilities 
embedded in maneuver brigades, increasing the ability of Russian conventional forces to deter 
or defeat air attacks against their units.  The weakest part of the Russian military is the Russian 
navy.  The Russian navy consists almost entirely of vintage Soviet vessels that desperately need 
modernization, if not total replacement. While the Russian navy is weak, it can still dominate 
the Black Sea against Ukrainian naval forces.  
 The Russian military has undertaken significant modernization of both their equipment 
and force structure since the war with Georgia in 2008. The poor performance of the Russian 
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military against a significantly weaker Georgian force during their short war was an 
embarrassment for the Kremlin.  In the aftermath of the war Moscow instituted a defense 
modernization program estimated to cost $700 million by 2020 with a goal of building a more 
professional, agile military force for smaller regional conflicts instead of large conventional 
wars.23 The economic downturn Russia has faced since the fall of oil prices and implementation 
of Western sanctions has slowed this modernization effort, especially hurting the development 
and fielding of new weapons systems. Personnel reforms have not been as effected by the 
economic issues as equipment modernization, but even these reforms have not been fully 
successful. The Russian military has gone through downsizing, cutting many of the skeleton 
units they maintained at minimal manning and planned to fill with conscripts in the event of a 
major war. The Kremlin has also worked to increase the number of positions in the military 
filled using contract soldiers.  These contract soldiers are volunteers who sign a contract to 
serve for a specified length of time and can be deployed abroad, as opposed to the conscripts 
that serve one year terms.  The Russian goal to have 350,000 contract soldiers in service by the 
end of 2015 was met by September 2015, according to Russian media sources.24 The Russian 
Army will man two-thirds of the required soldier and non-commissioned officer positions in the 
active military by contract soldiers (a total of 499,000 troops) by 2020, according to Russian 
military planners.  Whether or not the Russian military has met all of their stated goals for 
modernization and reforms is a fair question, but we can see that the Russian military is a much 
                                                          
23 Dmitri Trenin, “The Revival of the Russian Military: How Moscow Reloaded,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (May/June 
2016): 24. 
24 The Military Balance 2016, ed. James Hackett (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 
165. 
P a g e  | 20 
 
more capable force than it was in 2008 and would perform markedly better in a current 
conflict. The Russian government is attempting to demonstrate their revitalized military 
capabilities with their involvement in the Syria conflict.  The Ukrainian military must pay close 
attention to the capabilities Russian forces display in the Syrian conflict in order to identify 
weaknesses of the Russian force that could be exploited in a war between Ukraine and Russia. 
Ukrainian Military Capabilities 
 The Ukrainian military suffered from years of neglect prior to Russia’s illegal seizure of 
Crimea. The Ukrainian military had not been involved in a conflict in the post-Cold War period 
and military spending was not a priority for Kiev. Most of the country did not believe it faced 
any credible threats until the Russian-Georgian war in 2008.  In the aftermath of the Maidan in 
2013, the seizure of Crimea, and the outbreak of hostilities in the Donbas region the Ukrainian 
military has been forced to mobilize and confront a number of threats.  The Ukrainian military is 
currently engaged in ‘anti-terror’ operations in Eastern Ukraine, fighting against separatist 
groups from the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics. While continuing to 
fight the conflict in the east, the Ukrainian military has seen the need to reform and 
professionalize in the face of a conventional Russian threat.  While it is not likely the Russian 
Federation will attack Ukraine and begin a conventional war, the Ukrainian military must be 
ready for this possibility and has recognized this threat.  In September 2015, President 
Poroshenko signed into law the Military Doctrine of Ukraine which set defense policy for 
Ukraine.  The new military doctrine identifies the Russian Federation as the main threat to 
Ukraine and sets Ukraine’s top military objective as the ability to “Repeal the armed aggression 
by the Russian Federation, maintain Ukraine’s defense at a level sufficient to prevent armed 
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conflict, and in the event of armed conflict, for its localization and neutralization.”25 With their 
current force the Ukrainian military is unlikely to be able to achieve their first objective and 
repel an armed aggression.  Whether or not the Ukrainian military has the ability to deter 
armed aggression by Russia is hard to say. However, if the Ukrainian military continues to 
improve it can make any aggression by Russia so costly that it will outweigh any potential 
benefits. 
 The Ukrainian military has undergone rapid expansion since 2013 to meet their current 
security challenges.  According to The Military Balance 2016 the Ukrainian military has 204,000 
troops on active service and 900,000 in their reserves.26  The Ukrainian military reintroduced 
conscription in 2014 and has made great use of conscription to fill their ranks, especially by 
manning units the military was planning to disband before the outbreak of conflict. There are 
also paramilitary forces in Ukraine, but it is difficult to give accurate numbers of those troops as 
some fall outside governmental control.  The Ukrainian National Guard, which is a force under 
governmental control, numbers an estimated 52,000 troops. The Ukrainian government 
encouraged the formation of volunteer territorial defense units at the outbreak of the conflict, 
which were initially outside of governmental control.  Recently many of these units have been 
pulled under the control of the military and National Guard, in some cases as motorized rifle 
battalions.  
                                                          
25 "Military Doctrine of Ukraine," Military Technology 40, (June 15, 2016): 177. 
26 The Military Balance 2016, ed. James Hackett (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), 
204. 
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 The equipment used by Ukrainian forces leaves much to be desired. Ukraine has been 
an arms exporter since the fall of the Soviet Union, but they sold surplus Soviet equipment and 
did not produce new, high-tech 
weapons systems.  Most of the 
platforms used currently by the 
Ukrainian military are out of date 
and need to be modernized to 
effectively stand up to modern 
Russian weapons systems.  For 
example, Ukraine has almost 800 tanks in their inventory but most are dated T-64s that would 
be no match for modern Russian T-72 variants, not to mention T-90s or the new high tech (but 
not yet in service) T-14 Armata. In fact, a report from May 2016 stated the Ukrainians had not 
recorded a single kill on a T-90 in Eastern Ukraine.27 This is due to the use of Active Protection 
Systems (APS) such as reactive armor on Russian made T-90 tanks.  The Russians have 
continued to advance APS technologies that the Ukrainian military currently does not have the 
capacity to defeat.  As the Russians continue to advance this technology the Ukrainian military 
will need to acquire or develop state of the art anti-armor systems.  
 One area of strength for the Ukrainian military is the high number of soldiers with 
combat experience. Around 80 percent of Ukrainian soldiers have combat experience and many 
are receiving further training from U.S. and NATO partners (this is discussed in greater depth 
                                                          
27 Patrick Tucker, “How the Pentagon is Preparing for a Tank War with Russia,” Defense One, May 19, 2016, 
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/05/how-pentagon-preparing-tank-war-russia/128460/. 
UKRAINIAN T-64S IN EASTERN UKRAINE  
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below).28 The Ukrainian government’s efforts to pull volunteer battalions and militias back 
under governmental control have also added combat experience to the Ukrainian military. This 
collective combat experience has been a driving force in reforming Ukrainian military doctrine. 
The Ukrainian military operated more like the Soviet military than a modern fighting force 
before the outbreak of hostilities in the Donbas.  Since the fighting began in the East the 
Ukrainian military has modernized their tactics and techniques to match those of other modern 
militaries, especially those that have received training from NATO advisors. While the Ukrainian 
military will require years of modernization and training, they are now on the right track. 
CURRENT SITUATION 
 Since the annexation of Crimea, the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine has been 
embroiled in a civil conflict between the pro-Russian Donbas rebel groups and the military of 
the legitimate Ukraine government. Although from the outset it seemed an internal movement 
by Eastern Ukrainians with close ties to neighboring Russia encouraged by the events in Crimea, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin admitted direct involvement in the Donbas region in October 
2016. President Putin stated that “we [Russia] were forced to defend the Russian-speaking 
population of Donbas, forced to react to the desire of people living in Crimea to return to the 
Russian Federation.”29  
While this admission does not specify the level of involvement Russia has in the Donbas 
region, other statistics provide a window into what this support may look like. Ivanna 
                                                          
28 Paul D. Shinkman, “Training Ukraine: Turning a Soviet Army into a Modern Force,” U.S. News and World Report, 
August 2, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-08-02/training-ukraine-turning-a-soviet-army-into-a-
modern-force. 
29 Halya Coynach, “Putin admits to Russian military involvement in Donbas,” Human Rights in Ukraine, October 13, 
2016. Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1476316494.  
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Klympush-Tsintsadze, Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister on Euro-Atlantic Integration, made 
claims in August 2016 that during the course of the now two-year conflict, the capabilities of 
the Donbas rebels had significantly increased due to Russian support. Ukrainian General Staff 
data supports her assertion as estimates show that rebel tank numbers have increased from 30 
in 2014 to 600 in 2016. Similarly, the Donbas rebels’ armored vehicle numbers increased from 
124 to 1260, artillery and missile systems increased from 110 to 1060, and air defense systems 
increased from 50 to 470 in the same timeframe.30 
While specific Russian support to the Donbas rebels remains shrouded, their 
conventional military activities are much clearer.  Since 2014, Russia has significantly increased 
its conventional military presence along the Russia-Ukraine border. A new Russian motorized 
rifle division was created and stationed in Rostov, just outside of the Eastern Ukrainian border 
in May 2014. June 2016 saw two Russian motorized rifle brigades deployed to positions along 
the northern border of Ukraine. Citing an alleged incursion into Russian-held Crimea by 
Ukrainian forces in August, Russia significantly increased their military presence in Crimea and 
in the Black Sea, to include Russian S-400 surface to air missile systems.31 These forces have 
also conducted joint military exercises with the largest coming in September involving an 
estimated 120,000 personnel across much of the southern region of Russia, to include Crimea.32   
                                                          
30 Damien Sharkov, “Ukraine Claims Rebels Heavy Vehicles Increase Tenfold,” Newsweek, August 26, 2016. 
Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-claims-rebels-heavy-vehicles-increase-
tenfold-493822.  
31 Kathleen Weinberger and Franklin Holcomb, “Russian Build-Up In and Around Ukraine: August 12, 2016”, 
Institute for the Study of War, August 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016 from: 
http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russia%20in%20Ukraine%20August%202016_Final_FLAT.pdf.  
32 Maria Stromova, “Russia Holds Biggest Military Drill Yet in Annexed Crimea”, NBC News, September 11, 2016. 
Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-holds-biggest-military-drill-yet-
annexed-crimea-n646086.  
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While Russia’s military has been deploying and conducting conventional exercises near 
the Ukrainian border, Ukraine’s military has been engaged in combat with the Donbas rebel 
group. Unfortunately, this conflict has revealed a Ukrainian military that is in desperate need of 
professionalization and modernization.  In a report by The Atlantic Council, the 2014 Ukrainian 
army was assessed as an organization consisting of only 130,000 personnel with significant 
issues due to corruption, poor funding, inadequate equipping, and little education. Although 
they fought well and were somewhat effective against the well-equipped separatist group, 
Ukraine experienced significant losses, it’s most significant defeat coming at Debaltseve in 
February 2015. While the Ukrainian army made a convincing case that it could defeat the 
Donbas rebels if the rebels operated independently, the technical and logistic support provided 
by Russia gave the rebels a technological advantage.33 
The Ukrainian defeat at Debaltseve provided a much needed wake-up for Ukraine. 
Luckily, the second Minsk ceasefire agreement allowed Ukraine to adjust policy to address the 
threat.34 Ukraine drastically increased the funding for its defense forces, increased the size of 
the military from the initial 130,000 to 280,000 soldiers. Ukraine also focused on the revamping 
of their acquisitions systems, the transition to NATO standards, and incorporating methods that 
allow for a more expedient deployment of troops when needed.35 Additionally, Ukraine 
instituted a national guard that would be trained by the United States-led Joint Multinational 
                                                          
33 Ruben Gzirian, “Ukraine’s Got a Real Army Now. But Is It Preparing to Fight the Last Battle?”, The Atlantic 
Council, February 9, 2016. Accessed November 15, 2016 from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-
atlanticist/ukraine-s-got-a-real-army-now-but-is-it-preparing-to-fight-the-last-war.   
34 N.S. “What are the Minsk agreements?”, The Economist, September 13th 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016 
from:  http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-explains-7.  
35 N.S. “What are the Minsk agreements?”, The Economist, September 13th 2016. Accessed November 14, 2016 
from:  http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/09/economist-explains-7. 
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Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U). JMTG-U consists of rotational United States Army brigades 
and is responsible for the “training, 
equipping, training center development 
and doctrinal assistance to the 
Ukrainian armed forces.”36 The United 
States also began to provide military 
aid to Ukraine in the form of much-
needed, high-technology equipment. 
Currently, this equipment is non-lethal in nature, consisting mainly of up-armored HMMWVs 
and artillery locating radars.37  
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Given the current disparity between Russia and Ukraine, along with the annexation of 
Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Donbas, Russia can be identified as the greatest threat to 
Ukrainian sovereignty. As such, Ukraine, with assistance from the international community, 
must take steps to strengthen its military so Ukraine can better provide for its own security. 
This is difficult as Russia is a major power with a large, modern military. A determined 
conventional invasion of Ukraine by Russia would be difficult for Ukraine to defend against 
unilaterally. As such, the key to strengthening Ukraine’s military lies in the development of 
Ukraine’s ability to conventionally deter Russian aggression by developing a military capable of 
                                                          
36 U.S. Army Europe, “Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine”, Army Strong, Strong Europe! The Official 
Homepage of United States Army Europe: Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://www.eur.army.mil/jmtg-u/.   
37 Stockholm International Peace Research institute, “Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by 
recipient. Deals with deliveries or orders made for year range 2014 to 2015”, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. 
Information generated November 14 2016. Accessed November 14 2016 from: 
http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php.  
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incurring a cost on an invading force that would outweigh the benefit gained from invasion. 
Four policies are recommended to accomplish this task:  
 Provide loans to Ukraine ear-marked for defense spending.  
 Continue the mission of the JMTG-U beyond its current end date.  
 Further incorporate Ukraine into larger NATO and European military training exercises.  
 Encourage the development of Ukraine’s arms-producing infrastructure to decrease 
reliance on foreign arms trade.  
 While listed as separate policy recommendations, the provision of defense-focused 
funds and the further development of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex would work in 
concert to increase the quality of Ukraine’s military equipment and create a more effective 
fighting force. These loans would be similar to the United States’ Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) grants to Pakistan. A 2013 report by the Congressional Research Service reported that 
the United States Congress appropriated over $3 billion since 2001 to support FMF grants. 
These grants are designed allow for the purchase of U.S. military equipment in order to 
promote the modernization of the Pakistani military. The report goes on to list examples of the 
equipment purchased with FMF funds such as anti-armor TOW missiles, communications 
equipment, surveillance radars, and attack helicopters.38 
 The purpose of these funds is to allow Ukraine to purchase equipment from the United 
States that will augment the capabilities of the military equipment they are capable of 
                                                          
38 Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance”, Congressional Research Service July 
1, 2013. Accessed November 14, 2013 from: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf.  
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producing using their own military-industrial complex. Currently, Ukraine’s military-industrial 
complex is united under the Ukroboronprom Concern, a state-run organization formed in 2010 
to “ensure effective operations and management”39 of Ukrainian businesses that deal with 
defense equipment. A recent report shows that the group is capable of developing, 
manufacturing, repairing, and delivering necessary military equipment to Ukrainian military 
forces. This equipment includes armored vehicles and corresponding replacement parts, missile 
systems, artillery systems, communications equipment, and avionics.40 While the 
recommended FMF funds to Ukraine would be specified for national defense equipment, the 
United States should not specify exactly what equipment to buy. Instead, we recommend 
military advisors working with the JMTG-U assist Ukrainian military commanders to identify 
critical equipment deficiencies the Ukrainian industrial base simply cannot produce. Once 
identified, these deficiencies would then be submitted higher for purchase approval using FMF 
funds. While slightly cumbersome, this method allows Ukrainian military commanders to 
analyze their capabilities in-depth and strengthens Ukrainian logistical systems.  
 The JMTG-U’s current end of mission date is December 2016,41 however we recommend 
its mission be extended, its role expanded, and, instead of a specified redeployment date, a 
plan for a conditions-based reduction of responsibilities should be implemented as the way 
ahead.  The JTMG-U would expand their responsibilities by providing training on all equipment 
                                                          
39 “Ukraine state arms manufacturer ships 501 pieces of military hardware to army,” Ukraine Today, April 15, 2016. 
Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://uatoday.tv/politics/ukroboronprom-ships-501-pieces-of-military-
hardware-to-ukrainian-army-631334.html.  
40 “Ukraine state arms manufacturer ships 501 pieces of military hardware to army,” Ukraine Today, April 15, 2016. 
Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://uatoday.tv/politics/ukroboronprom-ships-501-pieces-of-military-
hardware-to-ukrainian-army-631334.html. 
41 U.S. Army Europe, “Joint Multinational Training Group – Ukraine”, Army Strong, Strong Europe! The Official 
Homepage of United States Army Europe: Accessed November 14, 2016 from: http://www.eur.army.mil/jmtg-u/.   
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purchased by Ukraine using FMF funds, providing logistics advisors to the Ukraine military to 
ensure combat units are properly supplied, and building Ukraine’s capacity to train their own 
soldiers through improvement of the Ukrainian non-commissioned officer corps. 
 The United States has made a concerted effort to conduct partnered training with NATO 
allies in recent years. Establishment of an Eastern European rotational force as well as large-
scale training events such as Operations Rapid Trident and Sea Breeze allow allied military units 
to partner with U.S. units, increasing familiarization on both sides with the other’s equipment 
and doctrine.42  This 
partnership also offers 
the opportunity for an 
increase in diplomatic 
relations as negotiations 
must take place to 
establish the training as 
well as the roles and 
responsibilities for the 
visiting units. Relationships are forged between the two militaries and, ultimately, all partnered 
nations gain a sense of being part of a larger entity. Increasing the Ukrainian presence in these 
                                                          
42 Communication and Engagement Directorate, Media Operations Division, “Operation Atlantic Resolve 
(September 2015)”, U.S. European Command, September 22, 2015. Accessed November 14, 2016 from: 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2014/0514_atlanticresolve/docs/Operation_Atlantic_Resolve_Fact_S
heet_22SEP2015.pdf.  
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training exercises with the rest of Europe will improve the ability for all involved militaries to 
work together as well as improve the bond between all involved countries. 
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Strengthening the Ukrainian Economy 
The overarching goal of the following recommendations for trade and the economy is to 
strengthen Ukraine by increasing the long-term capacity and independence of the Ukrainian 
economy. By creating a strong and independent Ukrainian economy fully integrated into the 
liberal free market system, Ukraine will enjoy greater stability and increased likelihood of 
success in progressive reforms. The United States has an interest in the continued stability and 
greater integration of Ukraine into the liberal international order, as it remains the best way to 
promote democracy and freedom. Without the involvement of the United States and other 
western states, there remains an opportunity in Ukraine for states such as Russia and China to 
exercise undue influence and undermine the liberal international order. 
The recommendations that follow promote the further integration of Ukraine into the 
liberal international order through the forging of international partnerships and the exchange 
of knowledge and technical skills in order uphold international norms. To that effect, the 
following recommendations are elaborated upon in this section: 
 Fully reauthorize the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America (EXIM). 
 Encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ukraine.  
 Invest in developing capacity in education, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and 
agriculture. 
 Maintain pressure on the Russian economy through the targeted application of 
sanctions. 
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Owing to its history and geography, Ukraine’s economy has traditionally been tied 
closely to Russian markets. Ukraine’s total trade volume with Russia is by far greater than that 
of any other trade volume with any other single state. From 2005 to 2009, Germany had the 
second largest trade volume with Ukraine, hovering around one-fourth the value of Russian 
trade volume. In 2010, China’s trade volume with Ukraine rose to second place and has stayed 
in that position up to 2015. Again, China’s trade volume remained around one-fourth to one-
fifth the value of Russia’s trade volume, until 2013 and the beginning of the Maidan Revolution 
when the Russia-Ukraine trade relationship fell off precipitously. However, even with a 
damaged trade relationship, the value of the Chinese trade volume did not approach parity. The 
only trade volume to rival the Russian trade volume is that with the European Union (EU)43 
which is commonly larger than the Russian trade volume.44  
 Russia has attempted to use this large trade relationship to influence Ukraine. In the 
years between the Orange Revolution and the beginning of the current conflict, the trade 
volume between Ukraine and Russia surpassed the trade volume between Ukraine and the EU 
in 2010, 2011, and 2012. This increase in the trade volume is evidence of Russian efforts to 
draw Ukraine away from the EU and closer to itself, economically and politically. When Russian 
efforts to draw Ukraine close appeared to be failing in the wake of the Maidan Revolution and 
the ensuing conflict, Russia cut trade with Ukraine, damaging the Ukrainian economy. Despite 
the damage caused by the precipitous decline of trade volume between Ukraine and Russia, the 
                                                          
43 The EU is considered an economic trading bloc wherein the trade volumes between Ukraine and each of the 28 
member states of the EU are added together to find the trade volume between Ukraine and the EU. 
44 All data from Bloomberg. 
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declining relationship creates an opportunity for Ukraine to strengthen its economy to 
withstand undue foreign influence. 
Amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, China’s interest in Ukraine has been quietly 
growing in recent years. While officially recorded Chinese FDI in Ukraine from 2003 to 
September 2016 is just over 600 million USD45, China has pledged tens of billions of dollars in 
forthcoming investment.46 They have also invested heavily in agriculture, leasing more than 
100,000 hectares of land with additional agreements that would raise that total into the 
millions.47 Chinese investment rarely includes incentives for progressive reforms, and large 
Chinese investment in Ukraine could potentially inhibit necessary reforms. 
The United States should assist Ukraine to develop an economy strong enough to 
withstand the influence undue foreign influence. Between Russia, China, and the United States, 
the United States has by far the smallest trade relationship with Ukraine with a total of 2.3 
billion USD. In conjunction with the EU, by improving the real numbers of trade with Ukraine, 
the United States can lessen any undue influence foreign states may have in Ukraine now and 
in the future. The recommendations provide in this paper are meant to strengthen the 
Ukrainian economy to a point where other states cannot use it as leverage against Ukraine. 
                                                          
45 By far the lowest FDI total compared to the United States, the EU, and Russia, per data from FDIMarkets. 
46 Asia Times. "Ukraine Strives to Carve Out a Role in China's Silk Road Strategy." http://www.atimes.com/ukraine-
strives-to-carve-out-a-role-in-chinas-silk-road-strategy/. 
47 Jourdan, Adam. "China to Invest in 3 Mln Hectares of Ukrainian Farmland." Reuters. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/china-ukraine-idUSL3N0HI04620130922. 
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EXIM Bank 
Existing agreements and programs facilitated through the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank must be 
revitalized. To that end, the EXIM must become fully operational, and the administrative hold 
which was placed on Ukraine, lifted. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs 
should be seen as a framework for future aid. To fulfill this goal, the United States should do 
the following:  
 Use existing programs and agreements to facilitate investment and international 
partnerships. 
There has already existed a robust trade encouragement program between the United 
States and Ukraine. These were facilitated, in large part, through EXIM. Due to bureaucratic 
difficulties, the EXIM was not reauthorized and went inactive for several years. Only recently 
has it been reauthorized and even now is not fully operational. The full board of directors must 
be appointed, and holds put into place due to ‘uncertainty of repayment caused by Ukraine’s 
current economic crisis and the Russian-backed conflict in Eastern Ukraine.’48 
 Existing partnerships and programs through organizations like OPIC, have worked to 
prove the importance of investment in the country. One such program has sought to increase 
credit availability for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) throughout Ukraine since 2015. By 
using these programs as examples and frameworks, the hold placed on any EXIM funding to 
Ukraine should be lifted. In addition, the MOU and Project Incentive Agreement of 2005 and 
1999 respectively should be revived and adapted to the current environment. The publicity and 
                                                          
48 Export.gov. "Ukraine: Project Financing." https://www.export.gov/apex/article2?id=Ukraine-Project-Financing. 
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public relations budgets of these organizations should be increased to further promote their 
usage. Any such aid or partnerships must be tied to corruption and other economic reforms. 
This would make the investment security and attractiveness of Ukraine greatly increase  
Foreign Direct Investment 
The United States should encourage continued foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Ukraine. Through investment in key economic sectors the United States can encourage stability 
now and create an environment conducive to future growth. To fulfill this goal, the United 
States should do the following: 
 Encourage FDI into key economic sectors in Ukraine. 
 Encourage FDI in the housing and construction markets. 
FDI can bring needed cash flow into struggling economies, encouraging growth and 
stability. Between 2003 and 2014, U.S. companies alone invested in 113 projects in Ukraine 
costing an estimated 5.19 billion USD and creating approximately 20,000 new jobs in a variety 
of sectors.49 The conflict in Ukraine has slowed investment into new projects and has damaged 
existing projects. Encouraging FDI into key sectors will reinforce the base of the economy and 
create jobs. Targeted sectors should include those that would lead to long term sustainable 
growth. For instance, projects in infrastructure create the necessary foundation on which to 
build an economy, projects in emerging markets lead to new jobs and opportunities where 
there may not have been, and projects in education create a knowledgeable and skilled 
workforce. 
                                                          
49 Data from FDImarkets 
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The illegal annexation of Crimea 
and the conflict in the Donbas region 
has forced many Ukrainians to flee their 
homes, becoming internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). To address the 
immediate need for jobs and homes for 
IDPs, FDI should be encouraged in the 
housing and construction sectors in those areas where IDPs are the most concentrated.50 The 
housing and construction industries can be particularly strong drivers of economic and job 
growth. A robust construction industry creates a need for goods and services, not only within 
itself, but also within every related sector as well.51 With 1.7 million IDPs52, strong housing and 
construction sectors will be instrumental in ensuring that all people have a safe and secure 
home where they are currently living. 
Capacity Development 
Education 
Education is a long-term investment in Ukraine’s future. By funding educational exchanges and 
other programs we invest in the long-term self-sufficiency and economic independence of the 
                                                          
50 The oblast of Odessa may be a potential candidate for such investment as an oblast with a higher number of 
IDPs, but away from the major conflict areas. According to the Ministry of Social Policy, in August of 2015 there 
were more than 31,000 IDPs located in Odessa, the largest amount outside of Kyiv and the conflict areas. 
51 For instance, for each building built, an electrician must wire it and a plumber must plumb it, along with a 
multitude of other laborers requiring other goods and providing other services. In addition to labor performed on 
the building, labor goes into the creation of all the materials and tools necessary in construction. Lastly, beyond 
the construction itself, labor will continue to go into the sale and upkeep of the building. 
52 Provisional estimates for 2016 from the Ministry of Social Policy via Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
(IDMC), http://www.internal-displacement.org/database/country/?iso3=ukr.  
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nation. Ukraine will be able to better withstand a hybrid war, where trade and economics are 
weapons in themselves. To fulfill this goal, the United States should do the following:  
 Increase the number of Fulbright awards available to Ukrainian students. 
 Encourage and facilitate college and high school level exchange programs.  
 Encourage the European Union and its member states to establish similar exchange 
programs. 
 Incorporate incentives for all program participants to return to Ukraine and implement 
the knowledge gained for the benefit of the state and the people. 
The theme of our recommendations is the encouragement of exchange programs. These 
can be through government partnerships, universities, or private corporations. We propose 
that all three be encouraged simultaneously, to double-down on the positive effects. Existing 
programs such as the Fulbright program should be expanded. The Muskie Exchange Program 
should be revived and expanded to include Ukraine. College and high school, in addition to 
private sector professional exchanges should be created. Ideally, an increase in Fulbright 
awards would double the average 15-20 awards for graduate students studying in the United 
States, and stabilize the funding to a set amount.53 
These partnerships already exist. For instance, beginning in 2014 after the withdrawal of 
Russia from its FLEX program, the American Councils for International Education reported that 
Ukrainians were expected to receive a majority of the over 100 spots formerly filled by Russian 
secondary school students.  
                                                          
53 The amount of awards and the source and variance of funding were confirmed with the Fulbright Coordinator 
for Ukraine in Kiev, Marta Kolomayets. 
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Emphasize the importance of including Ukrainian students. Offer planning or 
administrative support during the creation of state-run programs. Discuss opportunities for 
cooperation between European programs and U.S. programs. 
 In particular, an emphasis should be placed on government or civil service. The goal of 
this is to multiply the benefits received by Ukraine, by guaranteeing that the state shares in the 
increased knowledge and skills gained while abroad.  
Small and Medium Enterprises 
The United States should encourage the growth of Ukrainian SMEs and the formation of 
trade relationships between the United States and Ukraine. SMEs are critical in the creation of a 
true middle class, and trade partnerships create relationships that benefit all through the 
sharing of best practices and greater opportunities. To fulfill this goal, the United States should 
do the following: 
 Support and increase the funding of the Special American Business Internship Training 
(SABIT) program. 
 Create an exchange program between American and Ukrainian government officials in 
charge of creating and implementing industry regulations and reforms. 
The United States should capitalize on the SABIT program as a tool to support Ukrainian 
SMEs and foster trade relationships. SABIT was created in 1990 with the goal of strengthening 
the markets of former Soviet states by integrating them into Western markets through training 
and commercial ties. The SABIT program consists of two primary components: in-country 
expert seminars and on-site training in the United States. In addition to the formal parts of the 
program, SABIT maintains relationships through continuing education, alumni networks, and 
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business partnerships. Since its inception, nearly 1,200 Ukrainian professionals have 
participated in the SABIT program.54 Through SABIT, participants learn best practices from 
industry experts, and are then given the opportunity to see those practices in action at 
companies in the United States. Participants develop relationships within their cohort, as well 
as with the companies and people they meet in the United States, building a far-reaching 
network of SABIT trained professionals in their area.  
The United States could adjust SABIT to specifically target Ukrainian SMEs. As a crucial 
part of developing and sustaining a middle class, the direct targeting of SMEs will promote their 
growth within Ukraine and as trading partners with American companies. To accomplish this, 
SABIT may adjust its recruitment practices to find participants meeting a certain set of 
criteria55, and by providing scholarships to participants based on need. The creation of a 
program parallel to SABIT, but available only to Ukrainian companies, would also fulfill this goal. 
As a parallel program, it would have more flexibility to address needs specific to Ukraine. The 
program could be a temporary, or pilot, program subject to renewal or cancellation based on 
future conditions and need in Ukraine, and take its direction from the already established SABIT 
program. 
Along with targeting SMEs, the United States should make a concerted effort to recruit 
young professionals in SABIT programming. Working with individuals early in their careers will 
encourage them to develop relationships with companies and professionals in the U.S. that will 
                                                          
54 United States Department of Commerce. "SABIT Program Results: Ukraine." 
55 Criteria may include classifications such as SME status, new businesses less than five years old, businesses within 
certain sectors, etc. 
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last for many years to come. It will also provide them with important knowledge and technical 
skills early in their professional lives, resulting in the best return on investment. 
In addition to the reforms suggested in “Strengthening Ukrainian Institutions”, it will be 
essential to ensure that government officials have the knowledge necessary to identify reforms 
and regulations that protect the people without putting undue burden on companies. The 
United States should work with the Ukrainian government to establish exchanges of 
government officials in charge of industry regulations and reforms. Through exchanges, 
government officials from both states can learn from one another and share best practices. 
Such programs should target young professionals to ensure long-term change, but also include 
officials at all levels of government to aid even implementation. Through the creation of these 
relationships and the transfer of knowledge, undue burdens on companies can be mitigated 
and corruption limited.  
Agriculture 
Agriculture is a traditionally strong sector within Ukraine. By building upon the 
foundation already there, the U.S. can help Ukraine solidify a strong industry and ensure 
growth at a low cost. Efforts to build up the agriculture sector should focus on infusing new 
technology and knowledge. To fulfill this goal, the United States should do the following: 
 Encourage the development of new farmers through training and exchange programs. 
 Facilitate the purchase of pre-owned heavy agricultural machinery by Ukrainian farms. 
 Encourage programs training Ukrainian mechanics in new technologies. 
 Assist the Ukrainian government in creating a commission tasked with evaluating 
current land ownership laws and proposing potential land reforms. 
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Possessing 33 percent of the world’s most fertile black soil (or chernozem) , Ukraine’s 
agricultural sector has traditionally been very strong.56 Even today, Ukraine’s agriculture sector 
remains strong, producing enough agricultural commodities to export 7.6 billion USD.57 Despite 
the strength displayed by the agricultural sector, it is not yet producing at full capacity, 
particularly in comparison to yields in North America. According to a Ukrainian government 
publication:  
Average corn yield in the United States is 11 tons per hectare, whereas in 
Ukraine it is only 6.2. With additional investment into management, education, 
irrigation, farming techniques, logistics and seed, Ukraine is poised to double or 
triple its annual grain harvests of 60 million tons per annum.58  
Investment in agriculture presents Ukraine with the opportunity to invest in a sector where 
they already hold many of the necessary prerequisites. In addition, agriculture is not a sector 
that will go out of fashion, but rather will remain a critical sector as long as the world needs 
food. Modernization and 
the cultivation of new 
workers will give Ukraine 
the ability to improve 
production now and 
create growth for years to 
come. 
                                                          
56 Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine. Invest Ukraine: Open for UUkraine. Page 16. 
57 Bjerga, Alan and Volodymyr Verbyany. "That Boom You Hear is Ukraine's Agriculture." Bloomberg. 
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Like any industry, the agriculture sector requires a pool of individuals capable of the skill 
and knowledge necessary for the work. Despite the advances made in agriculture, it will remain 
a sector defined by its labor intensiveness. As the world modernizes, labor intensive careers, 
like agriculture, are viewed as less attractive in favor of more technology driven careers. It is 
important to provide young people with positive examples of what a life in agriculture can be, 
and encouragement in the early years of their careers to ensure they both have success and 
feel successful. 
The United States should aid Ukraine in the development of new farmers through the 
creation and facilitation of training and exchange programs. In doing so, the United States could 
incentivize enrollment in agricultural related degrees for state funded exchange programs. To 
create interest in agriculture as a young age, programs should target school age children to 
develop interest in agriculture from a young age.59 In addition to exchange programs and those 
intended for children and young adults, the United States could provide in-country 
programming for continuing education in agriculture focused on new technology, methods, and 
products through the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Foreign 
Agricultural Service (FAS). 
Modern equipment is critical to ensuring maximum yields, but is not always available to 
all Ukrainian farmers. Farmers in the United States can take advantage of tax incentives to 
trade in slightly used equipment in favor of brand new equipment60, regardless of whether a 
                                                          
59 Such programs could take on forms similar to agriculturally based programs for children and young adults in the 
United States, such as 4-H and FFA. 
60 Farmers in the United States can use the cost of the depreciation of their farm equipment as a tax write-off. 
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trade in is necessary. This high turnover rate of agricultural machinery has created an inventory 
of low-cost equipment with little use.61 Often, the equipment is in good shape, but U.S. dealers 
face obstacles when trying to resell to U.S. farmers, who receive larger tax write-offs by owning 
brand new equipment. As a testament to the quality of the equipment, many companies have 
created certified preowned (CPO) programs to give buyers peace of mind when purchasing 
used equipment.62 The substantial inventory of high-quality, low-cost equipment in the United 
States provides an opportunity for Ukrainian farms to upgrade their equipment to newer 
technology and higher horsepower at a reduced price. 
Though slightly used equipment is available in the United States, there must be a way to 
get the machinery to Ukraine and ensure that Ukrainian farmers are able to purchase it. To 
facilitate these purchases, funds should be set aside in the EXIM Bank63 for the purchase of such 
machinery. The United States Commercial Service could invest in programs educating exporters 
and importers on the shipping of heavy machinery. Equipment dealers in the United States 
should be encouraged to invest in partnerships with dealers in Ukraine, and trade shows with 
an emphasis on preowned equipment should be held in Ukraine to introduce options to 
Ukrainian farms and build relationships. 
In conjunction with the promotion of the purchase of pre-owned machinery, it is critical 
to ensure that mechanics in Ukraine have the knowledge and skill necessary to maintain and 
repair the machinery. New machinery utilizes modern technology, including computers and 
                                                          
61 Little use is defined as minimal wear and low hours. 
62 Vogt, Willie. "Certified Pre-Owned Machine Programs Grow." Farm Industry News. 
http://farmindustrynews.com/farm-equipment/certified-pre-owned-machine-programs-grow. 
63 For more recommendations regarding EXIM, see pages 33. 
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other electronics, that can be difficult for anyone to repair. Companies such as Titan Machinery 
have programs to sponsor students studying for associate degrees in diesel mechanics and 
Precision Ag/GPS.64 The United States could encourage programs that provide scholarships to 
Ukrainian citizens wishing to participate in mechanic training programs with an emphasis on 
agricultural machinery in the United States. In addition to exchange programs, the United 
States could invest in or aid the Ukrainian government in the creation of continuing education 
programming for mechanics in-country. 
Lastly, land reform remains an issue in Ukraine that needs to be addressed. Currently, 
there exists a moratorium on the sale of land, prohibiting land owners from selling even five 
acre plots in an effort to protect small farmers.65 Land reforms should focus on providing for 
fair ownership and ensuring a diversity of land owners. To that effect, the United States should 
encourage and aid Ukraine in establishing a commission to evaluate current land ownership 
laws and propose options based on the situation in Ukraine, as well as the successes and 
failures of other former Soviet states in land reform initiatives. 
Sanctions 
We recommend the continuation of the sanctions regime, with the explicit goal of causing the 
maximum intended consequences on appropriate Russian entities while having a limited effect 
on Ukraine and the general population. To fulfill this goal, the United States should do the 
following: 
                                                          
64 Titan Machinery. "Titan Machinery Service Technician Sponsorship Program." 
http://www.titanmachinery.com/service-tech-sponsor-program. 
65 Bjerga and Verbyany. "That Boom You Hear is Ukraine's Agriculture." 
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 Maintain, broaden and deepen existing sanctions against the Russian Federation. 
 Cease all government agency and government funded project involvement with the 
Russian Federation (and its subsidiaries) until the crisis is resolved. 
 Emphasize increased sanctions on the Russian military-industrial complex. 
The current sanction regime has focused on three key areas of the Russian economy: 
finance, energy and military-industrial. These sanctions have been put into effect by the United 
States and several dozen of its allies, with specific emphasis on the EU. The main instruments 
for sanctions in the U.S. have been Executive Orders. We propose broadening the 
interpretation and application of these orders (13660, 13661, etc.) to deepen the existing 
sector and individual sanctions.  
There are continuing projects going on between the governments which further provide 
resources and legitimacy to Russia. These must be phased out or cancelled. An example would 
be the use of Russian rocket engines by various NASA space projects Private corporations inside 
the U.S. are valid and politically preferable options.  
The Russian businesses and individuals who are directly involved and profit from the conflict 
should be the ones most affected by the sanctions regime. If the goal is not only to punish, but 
to send a message, then they must be targeted and harsh. In every way possible, using every 
tool available, the U.S. and its Allies must make it impossible for those involved to do business. 
This puts pressure on the Putin regime without placing undue burden on the Russian populace. 
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Countering Russian Propaganda 
Russian interference in Ukraine does not only apply to military involvement, but also 
relies heavily on the use of propaganda. Russian security services have been using soft power 
by implementing an information war. This hybrid warfare model relies on the “weaponization 
of information”- a covert action tool used by the Kremlin.66  Russia has been improving and 
establishing a strong repertoire of information warfare capabilities since the Cold War era 
Soviet Information Bureau. After the Cold War, Russia quickly realized that it could not compete 
militarily with the United States so it developed “elaborate [and] substantial ideas for non-
physical warfare.”67 A Russian manual entitled ‘Information-Psychological War Operations: A 
Short Encyclopedia and Reference Guide’ details information warfare techniques and 
procedures for a method that “is replacing standard war.”68 More recently, Russia has utilized 
propaganda in order to create dissent among Ukrainians and Russians and to disperse false 
information regarding the annexation of Crimea and invasion of the eastern region. Individuals 
inside the Donbas Region, Ukraine as a whole, and Western audiences are targeted by Russian 
propaganda in an effort to gain influence over the Crimean region.  
Russia utilizes psychological elements to spread disinformation within Ukraine. The 
Russian government uses the manipulation of TV coverage, stories, and images from previous 
conflicts/wars to implicate the Ukrainian government or the West in wrongdoing. These tools of 
information warfare often include alarming music and images of fire and violence which have 
                                                          
66 MacFarquhar, Neil “A Powerful Russian Weapon: The Spread of False Stories”, New York Times, AUG. 28, 2016 
http://nyti.ms/2bXVq1L 
67 Pomerantsev, Peter, “Inside Kremlin’s Hall of Mirrors”, The Guardian, April 9, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/apr/09/kremlin-hall-of-mirrors-military-information-psychology  
68 Ibid 
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contributed to the negative perceptions of Ukrainians by Russians during the uprising and 
overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych.  Russia’s perspective on the Ukrainian conflict is that it was 
“an uprising against the machinations of the United States and its purported Russophobic 
proxies [and the ousting] of the Russia-backed president Viktor Yanukovych after street 
protests in February 2014 amounted to an illegal coup.”69 The information is often distributed 
to illicit fear, undermine the West, and foster confusion in Ukraine and the West.70 
When the conflict in Ukraine initially began in 2014, the Kremlin denied any 
participation and denied reports that Russian troops were in Crimea.71 Once that fact was 
challenged internationally, the Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson, General Major Igor 
Konashenkov, indicated that the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine was simply for military 
exercises. He ignored NATO’s observations and Putin dismissed them as well. In response to 
satellite images showing proof that Russian troops were in Ukraine, the foreign Minister 
indicated they were just pictures from video games. The Kremlin accused the U.S. of spreading 
lies regarding the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine. But proof of Russian military 
involvement can be found by open source observation and analysis of the flow of arms, 
equipment, and artillery shelling. Images and videos posted on YouTube of Russian armored 
                                                          
69 Zavisca, Jane, and Theodore P. Gerber. The Washington Quarterly. N.p.: The Elliot School of International Affairs, 
2016. https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Summer2016_Gerber-
Zavisca.pdf.  
70 Applebaum, Anne & Lucas, Edward, The danger of Russian disinformation, The Washington Post, May 6, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-danger-of-russian-disinformation/2016/05/06/b31d9718-12d5-
11e6-8967-7ac733c56f12_story.html?utm_term=.e429ae309ba9 
71 Maksymilian Czuperski, John Herbst, Eliot Higgins, Alina Polyakova, and Damon Wilson, “Hiding in Plain Sight: 
Putin’s War in Ukraine” Atlantic Council May 2015 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/hiding-in-
plain-sight-putin-s-war-in-ukraine-and-boris-nemtsov-s-putin-war   
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vehicles and tanks prove 
that they were 
transported and utilized 
within Ukrainian borders. 
Figure 1 shows the dates, 
locations and types of 
vehicles being moved into 
Ukrainian territory from 
2014 to 2015.72  In March 
of 2015, Putin finally and publicly admitted to a pre-planned military campaign.73 However, 
denial of the facts regarding the situation in Ukraine has been standard practice for the 
Kremlin. 
Russia is seeking to influence Ukraine with propaganda through a multitude of 
platforms. Russia utilizes traditional media, such as television and print, as well as non-
traditional media, such as social media and text messaging. The most predominant platform is 
television. It is a “constant and aggressive source of lies and hatred, combined with a 
glorification of Stalinism and other attributes incompatible with democracy.”74 The majority of 
Russian channels showcase Russian news agencies that produce false new stories responsible 
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for disseminating lies to the Ukrainian people. There are also Russian produced films which are 
responsible for promoting Russian status and Russian backed disinformation. However, 
traditional means of obtaining television and movie channels through television sets is not the 
only method, the Russian produced media is also available through the internet.75 
Russia’s use of social media has predominantly included Vkontakte.ru (VK), the Russian 
version of Facebook, Odnoklassniki, another website dedicated to connecting classmates and 
old friends, and Instagram, a photo sharing app. VK has approximately 228 million users across 
prior soviet states, including Russia and Ukraine76. Odnoklassniki is the second largest social 
media website, targeting an older audience with approximately 65 million users.77 These 
websites and their volume of users 
are exposed to Russian produced 
propaganda on a widely-used 
platform. Russia uses ‘troll’ accounts 
to falsely spread information through 
social media platforms.78 A multitude 
of these users are unknowingly 
subjugated to false representation of activities and information. For example, Figure 2 is an 
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example of how an image of contractors in Louisiana was altered to indicate the presence of 
American mercenaries in Ukraine.79 This image was posted on numerous sites, and aired on 
Russian television throughout Ukraine. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement 
indicating their concern that foreign mercenaries were in the eastern regions of Ukraine.80 
However, this news story is one of many that have been debunked by non-governmental 
organizations that seek to promote truth in the Ukrainian conflict.  
Russia is continually seeking new opportunities and methods in its continuation of the 
information and psychological warfare in the Ukrainian conflict. In this effort, the Russian 
government has begun to utilize text messaging in its campaign in Ukraine. Text messages are 
sent to Ukrainians, including Ukrainian soldiers, in the Eastern region of Ukraine 5 to 15 
minutes before a Russian offensive action commences. These text messages are sent using a 
drone to every cellular phone in the targeted area.81 Additionally, the Russian government 
forces utilize social media methods discussed above for targeting pro-Ukrainian forces and 
supporters to influence individuals through their cell phones.  
While the use of radio has diminished since Soviet days, it still holds influence in Eastern 
European states. Ukrainian soldiers have access to numerous radio stations on the front lines in 
the East. But most choose to listen to stations broadcasted from Russia since they 
predominantly play the styles of music that are most desired: rock, metal, and rap. However, 
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many of these radio stations are disseminating a steady stream of anti-Ukrainian government 
information to try and inflict doubt in the minds of the soldiers.82 Some of the broadcasts 
accuse the Ukrainian government of doing nothing to help the people while the soldiers suffer 
on the front lines for no reason. It is difficult to counter this type of propaganda. It is subtle, and 
solely designed to instill doubt and lack of motivation in the hearts of the soldiers.  
The generational gap on attitudes about democracy and capitalism in Eastern Europe 
reflects a divide between the past, present, and future. Both young and old express concerns 
about the situation in their country, especially with regard to the economy. But while the older 
generation looks back longingly, often saying that people were better off financially under 
communism, the younger generation expresses more confidence that democracy can solve 
their country’s problems.83 This is a hopeful sign for the future, as the post-communist 
generation are the emerging leaders and decision-makers in Eastern Europe. However, Russia is 
able to utilize this divide. It exploits the older generations’ sentiments and fondness of the past 
in its effort to propagate itself as the harbinger of truth and justice.84 
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Influence of Russian propaganda is more powerful when applied to specific regions 
rather than attempting to exploit 
the generational divide in 
Ukraine. According to a recent 
survey, conducted by the Kiev 
International Institute of 
Sociology, the strongest areas 
with predispositions to believe 
Russian propaganda are the southern (excluding Crimea) and eastern Oblasts (shown by Figure 
3).85  
Acknowledging the limitations of the results due to a small sample size of approximately 
2000 respondents, this result is indicative of a potential need for counter propaganda. Had 
participants from Crimea been interviewed, the figure for the ‘South’ would have been altered. 
The survey also shows that 42.9 percent of participants either ‘somewhat’ or ‘fully’ distrust 
Ukrainian mass media. This distrust is not only due to the falsity of Russian produced 
information but also due to a lack of press freedom and a lack of credibility of the media 
production companies.  
It is not only the Russian produced propaganda that is affecting Ukrainian media and 
press. The laws within Ukraine, in regards to freedom of press, have not been upheld or 
enforced by the Ukrainian government in recent years. According to the press freedom report 
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produced by Freedom House in 2016, Ukraine was declared ‘partly free’.86 The report 
concluded that “the government of President Petro Poroshenko continued to strengthen media 
legislation, and violence against media workers [has] declined relative to 2014.”87 Freedom 
House scored Ukraine’s press freedom as ‘Partly Free’ in 201588 and ‘Not Free’ in 2014.89 The 
general focus of the report is that Ukrainian press laws are becoming stricter and press freedom 
is increasing. However, it is not ideal and needs improvement.  
The increased freedom does not translate to all journalists and reporters. There are 
reports of intimidation and violence against journalists that veer “from the government’s 
narrative on the conflict with Russia- backed separatists in the east, or [have] reported from 
separatist-held territories.”90 The criticism and attacks on journalists are from the public as well 
as from some high-ranking government officials.91 There have been a few questionable deaths 
of reporters including the recent death of photographer Pavel Sheremet by a car bomb in Kiev, 
Ukraine on July 20, 2016.92 Additionally, there have been attacks on physical properties such as 
the fire started at the headquarters of TV Inter, a Russian broadcasting channel,  by a group of 
twenty demonstrators.93 This attack occurred on September 4, 2016 and resulted in the injuries 
of several journalists and damage to the newsroom. Coverage of the crisis in Ukraine by this 
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station has been regarded has highly pro-Russian. These events showcase the lack of credibility 
and trust given to the press. Journalists are continually targeted with violence, intimidation, and 
cyber hacking/leaking of their sources and information94. Press freedom within Ukraine may be 
increasing, but it is nowhere near perfect. Russia’s propaganda campaign is fierce and 
impressive. Professor Valeriy Solovey of the Russian Foreign Ministry University MGIMO 
explained why propaganda can be so powerful: …”neurolinguistic programming is designed to 
send people into a ‘trance-like state’ where their critical faculties are depressed and the 
subconscious is open to suggestion.”95 Russian produced media elicited and fostered 
perceptions that inspired many Russians to go fight in Ukraine. However, the Russian 
propaganda campaign is not a complete success in Ukraine. Ukraine has not been passive in the 
propaganda fight against Russia. They have instituted legal reforms at the governmental level. 
In addition, non-governmental organizations are also actively fighting Russian disinformation in 
the Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, the civil society within Ukraine has experienced a surge of 
activism following the collapse of the Yanukovych government and the Russian incursion into 
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Ukrainian territory in 
2014.96 As Figure 4 
showcases, the Russians 
believe that the main party 
responsible for the fighting 
in Eastern Ukraine is the 
United States. However, 
the Russian government is 
largely blamed in the eyes 
of most Ukrainians 
surveyed.97  
The Ukrainian 
government has restricted access to television channels that reported Russian news and 
disinformation within Ukraine as early as March 2014. By December 2015, twenty-five channels 
had been included on the banned list.98 Furthermore, the Ukrainian government sought to limit 
Russian propaganda in March 2015 by prohibiting the “broadcasts of Russian films that had 
either been created after January 1, 2014 or glorified the Soviet regime or Russian militarism.”99 
The government enforced bans/limitations garnered backlash and protests from Ukrainian 
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citizens and people in Moscow. However, it was widely recognized that these measures were 
necessary for curbing Russian aggression and influence in the region.100 The bans have been 
effective in decreasing the number of Russian-made films airing on Ukrainian television by 
three quarters and a decrease from 22.7 percent to 12 percent of Ukraine’s population 
watching news on Russian television.101   
 The Ukrainian government is not the only institution that is working to stop the spread 
of Russian propaganda. There are a number of privately funded websites that work to publicize 
the inaccuracies and fallacies of news stories published by the Russian media. Two prominent 
examples are Stopfake.org and Russialies.com. Both of these internet sites seek to take false 
Russian news stories and find the actual events that explain the photos or images and publicize 
the truth behind them. Stopfake.org is an organization started in March 2014 by volunteers at 
the Journalism School of Mohyla University in Kiev.102 Russialies.com was founded by an 
American citizen with ethnic backgrounds in Eastern Europe. They have published thousands of 
reports and stories discounting Russian propaganda and disinformation.  
 The international community has also tried to assist Ukraine in resisting and preventing 
the influence of Russian propaganda. NATO established a Strategic Communications Center of 
Excellence in Latvia in 2015 to counter Russian propaganda.103 The Center produces reports 
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about propaganda and Russian techniques in its information war. Additionally, the European 
Endowment for Democracy and the European External Action Service carries out research and 
publishes reports on Russian media, its reach, and its impact on the Ukrainian conflict.104 The 
United States government has thus far failed to invest heavily in pushing back against the 
propaganda from Russia.105 However, American non-governmental organizations have 
contributed to countering Russian propaganda. For example, Spirit of America has recently 
funded a Ukrainian Army radio station, Army FM, for the purpose of boosting Ukrainian troop 
morale.106 A mutual Ukrainian and United States effort to subsist the propaganda from Russia is 
underway. However, there is room for improvement in regards to assisting Ukraine in its fight 
against the Russian disinformation campaign.  
Recommendations 
It is important for Ukraine to maintain and uphold the integrity of the media within 
Ukraine despite Russian aggression or interference. Ukraine must not curb the freedom of the 
press as it seeks to stop the information warfare from Russia. If Ukraine were to limit media 
freedom, then there would be little hope for the Ukrainians and the Ukrainian government 
would be seen as unjust and authoritarian.  
Our first recommendation for assisting Ukraine is to increase funding to media outlets. 
This can be done through U.S. funding of internationally focused entities such as Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty. The U.S. should earmark the funds for use on Ukrainian specific 
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information to provide comprehensive and unbiased access to news about the events of 
Ukraine. There should also be a push to counter Russian propaganda utilizing other platforms 
similar to the Spirit of America radio endeavor. 
Secondly, the U.S. should support judiciary promises of press freedom in Ukraine. This 
recommendation is posited in conjunction with the judiciary recommendations in the 
“Strengthening Ukrainian Institutions” section. The judicial system needs to be transparent and 
enforce the press freedom laws to protect journalists and promote unbiased information.  
Lastly, the United States must maintain separation from Ukraine’s media or government 
functioning to dispel any allegations of tampering or undue influence by the West. The 
information that is produced by Ukraine or Western backed entities must be verified and true.  
However, there must be a delicate balance between censorship and monitoring of the media. It 
is also essential to utilize all platforms to counter the Russian propaganda on those platforms. 
The U.S. should welcome involvement from other institutions, countries, or entities that wish to 
help the Ukrainians.  
In further areas of research, it is important to promote access to a free and open 
information environment. However, this must be accomplished with greater in-depth and in 
country analysis of Ukrainians access to the internet. Additionally, the funding of the entities 
that produce the pro-Russian propaganda in Ukraine should be investigated. These entities 
should be exposed and discounted.   
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Conclusion 
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seminar as part of their Masters of International Affairs program at The Bush School of 
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University in conjunction with U.S. -Ukraine 
Foundation. The goal of our research was to provide policy options for the incoming 
administration on how they can assist the Ukrainian government and strengthen Ukraine.   
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